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This paper is motivated in part by the problem of global warming: a solution will involve
providing a global public good, and will surely require the development of new technologies
and their implementation both in the countries that develop them and in others. We exam-
ine how the eﬀect of technological innovation on the cost structure of emission abatement
inﬂuences the countries’ incentives to reduce emissions, to invest in R&D, and share new
technologies with other countries. To analyze these issues, we use a simultaneous-move game
of emissions reduction and R&D investments where each country acts noncooperatively. We
hope that the intuitions we develop here can be valuable in managing the R&D process and
structuring international agreements on this topic.
In the context of climate change, most studies on emission control and technological
innovation predict that scenarios without policy intervention involve excessive emissions
and insuﬃcient R&D relative to the ﬁrst best levels. It is not widely recognized that a
crucial assumption behind this prediction is that the marginal abatement cost decreases as
technology improves. In fact this need not be the case: we provide examples of technological
changes which imply smaller total abatement costs but larger marginal abatement costs.
Using a simultaneous-move game of emissions reduction and R&D investments, we ﬁnd that
the equilibrium R&D investment can be larger than the ﬁrst best level in these examples.
Technological innovation is often induced by an international environmental agree-
ment (IEA). In some cases, IEAs explicitly encourage the signatories to cooperate in R&D.1
Several studies have examined how technology spillovers inﬂuence countries’ cooperation in
providing global public goods.2 Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) analyze the stability of IEAs
assuming that the signatories conduct R&D to develop a cleaner technology which is un-
available to non-signatories. Buchner et al. (2002) study the stability of climate change mit-
igation cooperation across countries when technology spillovers within cooperating countries
are larger than spillovers from cooperating countries to non-cooperating countries. Barrett
1Examples include a six-country pact for developing technology to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. See “Vision Statement of Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
the U.S. for a New Asia-Paciﬁc Partnership on Clean Development and Climate,” available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/50335.htm.
2Heal (1993) and Barrett (2003) argue that abatement eﬀorts and technology change in one country may
reduce the marginal abatement costs in other countries and the ﬁrst-best outcome may be supported once a
suﬃcient number of countries adopt higher environmental standards.
1(2003) raises two questions about their approach (pp.309-310). First, it is often diﬃcult
to prevent technology diﬀusion once new technology is developed. Second, given that a
cleaner technology is developed and signatories’ environmental damage is increasing in non-
signatories’ emissions, the signatories may have an incentive to allow the non-signatories to
use the cleaner technology so that the global emissions decline. Barret (2003) also argues that
no existing IEAs prevent the non-signatories from using new technology developed by the
signatories. For example, the Montreal Protocol requires that parties cooperate in promoting
R&D for a technology that reduces controlled substances, where non-parties are allowed easy
access to new technologies by the parties (Barret 2003, pp.309-10.) Indeed,there is a stronger
argument against the idea that new technologies will not spill over: this is that the companies
that develop them will want to sell them worldwide as part of a proﬁt-maximization strat-
egy. General Electric is aggressively promoting its carbon capture and storage technologies
worldwide, though they were developed in the U.S.
To investigate countries’ incentive for emission control and investments, we consider
a simultaneous-move game where the countries choose investments and emissions simultane-
ously when both technology and pollution spill over across countries. We ﬁnd the following
(see Table 1).
1. If each country’s marginal abatement cost is decreasing in R&D investment, then the
Nash equilibrium investments are lower and the equilibrium emissions are larger than
the ﬁrst-best levels. This result holds regardless of the degree of technology spillovers
among countries. This is the “conventional wisdom” case.
2. If the marginal abatement costs are increasing in investment, then the equilibrium
results in over-(under-)investment when the degree of spillovers is small (large) enough.
In this case, emissions may be less than in the ﬁrst best case. This case is contrary to
conventional wisdom.
The ﬁrst point is consistent with Golombek and Hoel (2004), who have the same
ﬁnding under the assumptions listed above. The second point implies that whether the
ﬁrst claim holds depends on the relationship between R&D and the marginal abatement
costs. Section 2 discusses cases in which marginal abatement costs may increase under a
new technology.
2Intuitively we can see why the movement of marginal abatement costs (MACs) is
important. Suppose that technological development leads to an abatement technology with
lower ﬁxed and higher variable costs, and lower average costs - we will suggest below that
this accurately describes one of the main technologies now being developed, that of carbon
capture and storage. Then the lower ﬁxed costs have an income eﬀect which will typically
lead to the choice of more abatement. However the higher MAC produces a substitution
eﬀect that acts in the opposite direction. In such a situation it is not clear whether the
outcome will be more or less abatement. This is true for both the socially optimal allocation
and the Nash equilibrium allocation, but it is stronger for the ﬁrst best case and so tends
to reduce abatement more, reduce emissions less, in this case. This opens up the possibility
that Nash emissions may be less than the ﬁrst best, as Nash abatement is reduced less. We
show below that this can happen when spillovers are large: large spillovers tend of course
to counteract the standard arguments about free riders and public goods. Large spillovers
provide income eﬀects to all countries, similarly to lower ﬁxed costs. This explains why we
ﬁnd counterintuitive outcomes with small income eﬀects.
[Table 1]
The next section discusses examples of technologies where the marginal abatement
cost may decrease or increase as a result of technology innovation. Section 3 describes the
assumption of our analysis, the result, and discussions regarding alternative assumptions.
Section 4 concludes the paper with policy implications.
2 Technology innovation and marginal abatement costs
The relationship between marginal abatement costs and R&D is central to some of our
results. We expect, of course, that abatement costs will fall as a result of successful R&D—
that is in eﬀect the deﬁnition of success in R&D. Presumably we mean the total cost of
attaining a given level of abatement falls, but this leaves open the impact of R&D on the
ﬁxed and variable costs of reducing emissions. In principle, successful R&D can introduce a
new technology whose cost structure is totally diﬀerent from that of the current technology.
The current technology may for example have high ﬁxed and low variable costs, whereas the
new one has low ﬁxed costs and high variable costs. In this case the total and average costs
3would be lower but the marginal abatement cost might be higher with the new technology.
These issues are discussed to some degree in Baker et al. (2006, 2008), who consider the
eﬀect of uncertainty about the costs of climate change on the optimal spending on R&D:
they ﬁnd that the abatement cost curve can change in many diﬀerent ways as a result of
R&D, depending on the parameters of the model. Bauman (2003) and Brechet and Jouvet
(2006) also present theoretical models which demonstrate that the marginal abatement cost
may be higher with new technology. The Economics of Climate Change (Stern Review,
2006) also notes that “step-change improvements in a technology might accelerate progress
[of declining marginal costs], while constraints such as the availability of land or materials
could result in increasing marginal costs” (Executive Summary, p.xx).
Researchers are currently investigating many diﬀerent technologies for CO2 abate-
ment. Integrated combined cycle coal gasiﬁcation (ICCCG) with carbon capture and storage
is one possibility: coal combustion with cryogenic oxygen and carbon capture and storage
is another, and the use of renewable energy sources and nuclear power represent yet more
alternatives. If we think of renewable energy and nuclear as the current abatement technolo-
gies, and ICCCG with C-capture and storage as a possible new technology, then the change
in cost structures in going from the old to the new technologies is instructive. Renewable
energy sources and nuclear have high ﬁxed costs but almost no variable costs, so that the
marginal cost of abatement along this route is close to zero even though the average is high.
ICCCG with C-capture and storage, by contrast, would have high marginal costs: each ton
of CO2 has to be captured (perhaps $5 per ton) and then transported (perhaps $10 per ton)
and stored (perhaps $5 per ton). We would not use this technology unless its average cost
were less than renewables, but if we used it we would face a higher marginal cost.3
3 A game with emissions and technology externality
3.1 Assumptions, the optimal outcome, and the symmetric Nash
equilibrium
Suppose N countries choose R&D investments and emissions for developing abatement tech-
nology. Let (ki,ei) ≥ 0 be country i’s investment and emissions choice. Country i’s cost of
3We are grateful to Klaus Lackner for an instructive discussion of these issues.
4investing ki is given by G(ki) ≥ 0 where G′ > 0,G′′ ≥ 0. When the countries’ investment
proﬁle is k = (k1,...,kN), country i’s cost of reducing emissions from its status-quo level
¯ e > 0 to a level ei ≥ 0 is given by C(ei,zi(k)) ≥ 0 where




The function zi represents the eﬀective amount of abatement capital available to country
i given investment proﬁle k. The exogenous parameter λ ∈ [0,1] represents the extent of
innovation spillovers across countries. There is no technology diﬀusion and R&D is a private
good if λ = 0. With complete spillovers, λ is equal to one. The abatement cost function
C is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and convex with Ce < 0,Cz < 0,Cee > 0,Czz > 0 for
all e < ¯ e. (Subscripts stand for partial derivatives.) We assume Cez is positive, zero, or
negative. The marginal abatement cost −Ce is decreasing in investment if Cez > 0. Given
total emissions E =
 
j ej, country i’s damage is D(E) ≥ 0 where D′ > 0 and D′′ > 0.
We assume that the countries choose investment and emissions simultaneously. The
main result of the paper will hold if the countries choose investment and emissions sequen-
tially (i.e. they choose investment simultaneously ﬁrst, and then emissions simultaneously).
The ﬁrst-best investment emission and allocation {k∗
i,e∗
i} minimizes the social cost of
emissions
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where f(λ) ≡ 1 + (N − 1)λ. Similarly, an interior Nash equilibrium {  ki,  ei} satisﬁes
G′(  ki) + Cz(  ei,  ki + λ
 
j =i  kj) = 0, Ce(  ei,  ki + λ
 
j =i  kj) + D′(
 
j   ej) = 0
for all i. The symmetric Nash equilibrium (  e,  k) where (  ki,  ei) = (  k,  e) for all i satisﬁes
G
′(  k) + Cz(  e,f(λ)  k) = 0, (3)
5Ce(  e,f(λ)  k) + D
′(N  e) = 0. (4)
Under the assumptions on C and D, we can solve conditions (2) and (4) for emissions as a
function of investment in the ﬁrst best allocation and in the Nash equilibrium. Call these
functions ef and en. (Superscript f stands for the ﬁrst best and n for Nash equilibrium.
Note that ef(k∗) = e∗ and en(  k) =   e.) These functions satisfy the following property. (See
the appendix for the proofs.)
Lemma 1 en(k) > ef(k) for all k > 0.
Lemma 2 If Cez   0, then def
dk ⋚ 0 and den
dk ⋚ 0.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium investment by each country is decreasing in the degree of technol-
ogy spillovers λ (i.e.
∂  k
∂λ < 0). The ﬁrst-best investment by each country may be decreasing
or increasing in technology spillovers. The equilibrium and the ﬁrst best emissions are non-
increasing (nondecreasing) in λ if Cez > (<)0.
Given the same investment level, the Nash equilibrium emission is larger than the
ﬁrst best level (Lemma 1). Both the equilibrium and the ﬁrst best emissions are decreasing
(increasing) in investment if the marginal abatement cost is decreasing (increasing) in invest-
ment (Lemma 2). See ﬁgure 3 for an example where the ﬁrst-best investment may decrease
when the degree of technology spillovers increases.
3.2 Main results
The following proposition is based on the three lemmas and compares the ﬁrst best solu-
tion and the Nash equilibrium outcome of the game where countries choose investment and
emissions simultaneously.
Proposition 1 Let {k∗,e∗} be the ﬁrst best investment and emission of each country and
{  k,  e} be the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
(i) If Cez > 0, then   e > e∗ and   k < k∗ for all λ ∈ [0,1].
(ii) If Cez = 0 and λ = 0, then   e > e∗ and   k = k∗. If Cez = 0 and λ > 0, then   e > e∗ and
  k < k∗.
6(iii) If Cez < 0 and (N − 1)λ <
Cz(en(  k),f(λ)  k)
Cz(ef(  k),f(λ)  k) − 1, then   e > e∗ and   k > k∗. If Cez < 0 and
(N − 1)λ >
Cz(en(  k),f(λ)  k)
Cz(ef(  k),f(λ)  k) − 1, then   k < k∗.
The equilibrium emission is larger than the ﬁrst best level if the marginal abatement
cost is nonincreasing in R&D or if the spillover eﬀect is small. If the marginal abatement
cost is decreasing in investment (Cez > 0), then the equilibrium investment is smaller than
the ﬁrst best level regardless of the spillover eﬀect λ. If Cez = 0, then the equilibrium
investment is the same as the ﬁrst best level under no spillover and under-investment occurs
under spillovers. If the marginal abatement cost is increasing in investment (Cez < 0), then
over-investment occurs when spillovers and the number of countries are small while under-
investment occurs when spillovers or the number of countries are large. Larger marginal
abatement costs imply larger ex-post optimal emissions and hence larger damages to each
country. With small technology spillovers and the marginal abatement costs increasing
in investments, each country’s privately optimal investment exceeds the socially optimal
investment.
Part (i) has been demonstrated in literature (e.g. Golombek and Hoel 2004) and
perhaps not surprising. We explain part (iii) graphically by assuming Cez < 0. Figure 1
contrasts a representative country’s optimal and equilibrium emission and investment choice.
The ﬁgure also assumes λ = 0, and hence the only source of externality is emissions. While
the marginal abatement cost of each country equals the social (aggregate) marginal damages
of all countries under the optimal outcome, the equilibrium emission equates the marginal
abatement cost and the private marginal damages for each country (panel b). The assump-
tion Cze ≡ Cez < 0 implies that the marginal beneﬁt of investment (i.e. the marginal
reduction in abatement cost due to investment) is smaller under smaller emissions (see panel
a), and hence the equilibrium investment exceeds the ﬁrst best level. Figure 2 illustrates a
case where the equilibrium emission is lower than the ﬁrst best level. Given λ > 0, technology
spillover is an additional source of externality. The spillovers tend to lower the equilibrium
investment relative to the ﬁrst best level. With λ suﬃciently large, the equilibrium invest-
ment ˆ k exceeds the ﬁrst best level k∗ and hence the marginal abatement cost curve given ˆ k
lies to the left of the marginal abatement cost curve given k∗. Therefore, as in Figure 2, the
equilibrium emission (given by the intersection of the marginal abatement cost given ˆ k and
the private marginal damage) can fall below the ﬁrst best emission (given by the intersection




The following example illustrates the result of Proposition 1:
G(k) = rk, C(e,z) = f(z) + a(z)(¯ e − e) +
b(z)
2






where the quantity ¯ e represents the emission level in the absence of abatement, and ¯ e − e
the abatement level. The function f represents the ﬁxed cost of emission abatement. As
explained in the previous section, f may be decreasing or increasing in the eﬀective capital z.
We assume f is strictly convex. At an emission level e ∈ [0,¯ e], the marginal abatement cost is
given by a(z)+b(z)(¯ e−e) and its derivative with respect to investment is a′(z)+b′(z)(¯ e−e).
For simplicity, assume




2, a(z) = az, b(z) ≡ b, (6)
for all z ≥ 0 where f2 and b are positive while f1 and a may be positive or negative. New
technology results in either lower marginal abatement cost, lower ﬁxed cost of abatement,
or both. If f1 > 0 and a > 0, then investment results in technologies with lower ﬁxed costs
and larger marginal abatement cost. If a < 0, then investment results in smaller marginal
abatement cost. Convexity of C requires bf2 − a2 ≥ 0.
[Figure 3]
Figure 3 illustrates the result of Proposition 1 using the above example with a = 1,b =
1,d = .75,N = 2,r = 1.5,f1 = 2,f2 = 1,¯ e = .5. (Note that a > 0 implies Cez < 0, i.e. the
marginal abatement cost is increasing in investment.) This example illustrates part (iii) of
Proposition 1:
• With small technology spillovers, the equilibrium emissions are larger than the optimal
level. The equilibrium investment level is larger than the optimal level.
4Though the ﬁgure assumes that G′′ = 0, the argument is also valid when G′′ > 0.
8• With large technology spillovers, the equilibrium emissions are smaller than the optimal
level. The equilibrium investment level is smaller than the optimal level.
As discussed in section 1, this example corresponds to the case where the current technology
is renewable energy and the new technology is ICCCG with carbon capture. When the
spillover eﬀect is small, the equilibrium may result in over-investment. When the spillover
eﬀect is large, the equilibrium may result in under-emissions.
Proposition 1 states that the equilibrium emission exceeds the optimal level whenever
the equilibrium investment is larger than the optimal level. Figure 3 demonstrates that
the equilibrium emissions can exceed the ﬁrst best level when the equilibrium investment is
smaller than the optimal level. As in Lemma 2, both the equilibrium and optimal emissions
are increasing in investment when the marginal abatement cost is increasing in investment.
Hence, when under-investment occurs at the equilibrium, the equilibrium emissions may fall
below the optimal level. However, as Figure 4 illustrates, the equilibrium emissions are not
necessarily smaller than the optimal level when λ is large.
[Figure 4]
3.4 Investment and emissions under alternative assumptions
We discuss the results under alternative assumptions.
We assumed that the countries choose investment and emissions simultaneously. It
might be more natural to assume that the countries choose investment ﬁrst and then emis-
sions. The result about over-investment under increasing marginal abatement cost holds
under the alternative assumption of sequential move.
Though we present our result in the context of transboundary pollution with countries
as players, our analysis has an implication to domestic environmental regulation with a
regulator and regulated ﬁrms as players. A large number of studies have compared regulated
ﬁrms’ incentive for technology innovation and adoption under alternative emission regulation
(such as emissions quantity standards, emissions taxes, and emissions trading, see Milliman
and Prince 1989, Requate et al. 2003, Newell and Jaﬀe et al. 2003). A number of studies
have found that, when the regulator sets emissions standards or emissions taxes after the
ﬁrms conduct investment, the regulated ﬁrms have an incentive to over-invest (relative to
9the optimal level) under taxes and under-invest under standards (Malik 1991, Kennedy and
Laplante 1999, Karp and Zhang 2002, Moledina et al. 2003, Tarui and Polasky 2006). They
assume that the marginal abatement costs are decreasing in investment. If the marginal
abatement costs are increasing investment, then the opposite incentive will work under taxes
and standards. Baker et al. (2008) present a thorough summary of the implications of the
increasing marginal abatement costs and provide a raking of alternative emission policy
instruments under the assumption.
The analysis in this section assumed that the countries are identical. A more real-
istic model would assume that countries diﬀer in abatement costs and pollution damage
functions. With heterogeneity, the equilibrium investment (emission) of some countries may
be larger (lower) than the ﬁrst best level even if the marginal abatement cost is decreasing
in investment. This possibility is analogous to the free-rider problem associated with the
private provision of public goods: with heterogenous players, those who would beneﬁt most
(less) from public goods may contribute more (less) to the supply of public goods.
4 Discussion
This paper studied countries’ incentives to reduce emissions of pollutants and develop a
new emission abatement technology when technology diﬀusion across countries may occur
and emission reduction is a global public good. If the marginal abatement cost of each
country is decreasing in investment, then the Nash equilibrium results in excessive emissions
and under-investment in innovation relative to the ﬁrst-best under any degree of technology
spillovers. The equilibrium results in over-investment when spillovers are small enough and
if the marginal abatement cost is increasing in investment.
Our study is motivated in part by the problem of global climate change: it is clear
that a comprehensive solution needs new technologies, that solving the problem is providing
a global public good, and that the trade-oﬀs we model here are central to policy choices
about funding R&D and about treaty formats. Our ﬁnding implies that the direction to
which the incentives for investments and emission reduction are biased depends on the types
of technologies involved and the degree of technology spillovers. In particular, the transitions
from one pollution abatement technology to another do not necessarily justify subsidizing
10it even if the emission causes a negative externality. Though the model applies to trans-
boundary pollution and technology spillovers across countries, the implication extends to
environmental regulation on industries in a domestic context as well (see section 3.4).
We did not consider several important aspects of investments and emission reduc-
tion in international and national contexts such as government-industry interactions (ﬁrms’
incentive to innovate given costly R&D and/or patenting or licensing opportunities given im-
perfect appropriability of innovation), heterogeneity among countries, and dynamics (changes
in technology, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and treaty participation over time). We as-
sumed deterministic innovation.5 Though some of these issues are discussed in the previous
section, further analysis is left for future research.
Appendix











for all k > 0 by condition (4). Because Ce + ND′ is increasing in emissions, it follows that
en(k) > ef(k) for all k > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2












which is positive if Cez < 0 and negative if Cez > 0. Similarly, total diﬀerentiation of
condition (4) yields
Ceed  e + f(λ)Cezdk + ND






which is positive if Cez < 0 and negative if Cez > 0.
5For the analysis of IEAs with stochastic technological change, see Kolstad (2007).
11Proof of Lemma 3
Diﬀerentiate the equations (3) and (4) with respect to λ and obtain


G′′ + f(λ)Czz Cze





































∂λ ≤ (≥)0 if Cez ≥ (≤)0. The equilibrium investment is decreasing in λ (
∂  k
∂λ < 0)
regardless of the sign of Cez.
Similarly, diﬀerentiate the equations (1) and (2) with respect to λ and obtain


G′′ + f2Czz fCze










































∂λ < (>)0 if Cez > (<)0. The sign of ∂k∗
∂λ is indeterminate.
Proof of Proposition 1










Similarly, the equilibrium investment   k satisﬁes
F(  k) ≡ G
′(  k) + Cz(e
n(  k),f(λ)  k) = 0.
12Note that
def
dk < 0 and
den
dk < 0 by lemma 2 and Cez > 0. For any k ≥ 0 we have
F






where the last inequality follows from Cz < 0 and f(λ) ≥ 1 for all λ ∈ [0,1]. Because Cze > 0
by assumption and ef(k) < en(k) by lemma 1, we have Cz(ef(k),f(λ)k)−Cz(en(k),f(λ)k) <
0. Hence,   k (that satisﬁes F(  k) = 0) must be smaller than k∗ (that satisﬁes F ∗(k∗) = 0)
regardless of the value of λ. Finally,   k < k∗ implies   e = en(  k) > en(k∗) > ef(k∗) = e∗.









where φk(z) ≡ Cz(e,z) for all e,z and φe(e) ≡ Ce(e,z) for all e,z. These two conditions
determine the ﬁrst best invest and emission independently. Similarly, conditions (3) and (4)
for the Nash equilibrium are equivalent to
G
′(  k) + φk(f(λ)  k) = 0, (8)
φe(  e) + D
′(N  e) = 0.
Lemma 1 implies   e > e∗ for any λ. If λ = 0, then conditions (7) and (8) are identical and





for all k because φk < 0. If follows from G′′ + φ′
k > 0 that   k < k∗.
To show (iii), suppose Cez < 0. If λ = 0, then
F
∗(k) − F(k) = Cz(e
f(k),k) − Cz(e
n(k),k)




13for all k. Hence, F ∗(k) − F(k) > 0 for all k. This implies that   k > k∗. Emissions satisfy
  e = en(  k) > ef(  k) > ef(k∗) = e∗ where the last inequality follows from lemma 2 and the
assumption Cez < 0.











Cee + N2D′′ > 0.
Inequality   k > k∗ also implies   e = en(  k) > ef(  k) > ef(k∗) = e∗. It follows from F(  k) = 0
that F ∗(  k) − F(  k) > 0, i.e.
f(λ)Cz(e
f(  k),f(λ)  k) − Cz(e
n(  k),f(λ)  k) > 0.
Because Cz < 0 and f(λ) = 1 + (N − 1)λ, this inequality is equivalent to
(N − 1)λ <
Cz(en(  k),f(λ)  k)
Cz(ef(  k),f(λ)  k)
− 1. (9)
Because Cz < 0,Cze < 0 and en > ek, the right hand side is positive. The inequality (9)
implies   k > k∗ and   e > e∗. We have   k ≤ k∗ if (9) does not hold.
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16Table 1: Equilibrium outcome of simultaneous-move games
Technology Marginal abatement costs
spillovers Decreasing in R&D Increasing in R&D
Emissions Investment Emissions Investment
Small Too large Too small Too large Too large
Large Too large Too small ? Too small
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MB of investment is the negative of the partial derivative of abatement cost with respect 
to investment. MC of investment is the derivative of investment cost. MAC is the 
negative of the partial derivative of abatement codst with respect to emissions. Private 
and social MD refer to the marginal damage at a country level and at the aggregate, 
global level.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium and the ﬁrst best when Cez < 0 and λ = 0.
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The figure is based on a linear quadratic example (equations 5, 6) with a = 1, 
b = 1, d = .75, N =2, r = 1.5, f1 = 2, f2 = 1, e= .5.  In the two panels, the 
horizontal axes measure the degree of spillovers (0: no spillovers, 1: highest 
degree of spillovers). 
























The figure is based on a linear quadratic example (equations 5, 6) with a = 1, 
b = 1, d = .75, N =2, r = 1.3, f1 = 2, f2 = 1, e= .5.  In the two panels, the 
horizontal axes measure the degree of spillovers (0: no spillovers, 1: highest 
degree of spillovers). 
Figure 4: The equilibrium and the ﬁrst best when Cez < 0 (2).
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